The United States is nearing a significant election period, and various state officials are voicing increasing concern over the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s ability and dependability, especially due to reduced personnel and persistent distrust stemming from the policies of the Trump administration. Though DHS continues to be a vital federal agency responsible for supporting states in securing elections against both internal and external dangers, doubts have arisen about its perceived trustworthiness and operational efficacy.
In recent months, a number of state election leaders have voiced apprehension about relying on DHS’s cybersecurity and infrastructure security divisions, citing concerns that stem from both institutional shifts during the previous administration and ongoing resource limitations. Their worries highlight a broader issue in America’s decentralized electoral system: how state and federal agencies collaborate to protect one of democracy’s most essential functions.
During former President Donald Trump’s tenure, the relationship between DHS and state election officials was often contentious. Despite the formation of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in 2018—a DHS subdivision created to support critical infrastructure protection, including election systems—Trump’s rhetoric surrounding election legitimacy frequently clashed with CISA’s public statements.
In the aftermath of the 2020 election, CISA officials asserted that the vote was secure and that there was no evidence of widespread fraud. This directly contradicted Trump’s claims of electoral misconduct, leading to the firing of CISA Director Christopher Krebs, whose dismissal shocked cybersecurity experts and public officials alike. That moment marked a turning point in the perception of DHS’s neutrality and reliability among some state governments.
Currently, despite the change in leadership, the agency continues to deal with ongoing doubts, particularly from individuals who feel that political influence might have affected its autonomy. Consequently, some states remain cautious about completely trusting DHS for assistance related to elections, even as cyber threats to voter data, election systems, and public confidence increase.
Adding to the problem of trust is a decrease in personnel in essential departments within DHS that give cybersecurity support to state and local governments. Based on internal reviews and public reports, numerous cybersecurity positions are unfilled, hindering the agency’s capacity to provide prompt assistance or allocate resources during important election times.
For example, election officials in several states report delays in receiving DHS vulnerability assessments or intelligence briefings. These services—once seen as essential tools in preparing for cyberattacks or disinformation campaigns—have become harder to access due to limited personnel and strained coordination between federal and state actors.
In some cases, states have turned to private cybersecurity firms or established independent teams to compensate for the perceived shortfall in federal support. While these measures can provide valuable protection, they may also lead to inconsistent standards and fragmented security protocols across jurisdictions.
In response to their concerns, state election officials have sought to bolster in-house cybersecurity capabilities and forge partnerships with more trusted federal or non-governmental entities. Several states have expanded their own election security offices, hired dedicated information security officers, and increased investments in staff training and technological upgrades.
Additionally, some secretaries of state have pursued collaboration with the National Guard’s cybersecurity units or academic institutions with expertise in election integrity. These alternatives allow states to retain greater control over their systems while still benefiting from external expertise.
Despite this pivot, many states acknowledge that DHS still holds valuable resources, particularly in threat intelligence, vulnerability scanning, and coordination with intelligence agencies. The challenge lies in rebuilding the kind of collaborative relationship that can make these tools both effective and trusted.
Since the shift to the Biden administration, CISA has been actively working to re-establish its reputation as an impartial guardian of electoral security. With new management in place, the organization has initiated programs to reassure state authorities of its dedication to openness and impartiality. These efforts incorporate frequent threat updates, open-to-public online seminars, and local security conferences designed to address the specific needs of regional election officials.
CISA has also emphasized the importance of its role as a “trusted partner,” offering free services such as risk assessments, intrusion detection tools, and best practices guides for election infrastructure protection. However, the lingering impact of prior controversies continues to affect how some states perceive and utilize these offerings.
To tackle these challenges, the agency is focusing on broadening its recruitment channels and enhancing collaboration with other agencies, yet restoring trust is an enduring endeavor. Election security authorities emphasize that uniformity, transparent communication, and maintaining political neutrality will be crucial for fortifying these alliances in the future.
As election-related cyber threats continue to evolve, the importance of cohesive federal-state collaboration becomes even more critical. State systems remain frequent targets of ransomware attacks, phishing campaigns, and influence operations originating from abroad. Without unified defense strategies and shared information channels, the nation’s electoral integrity may become increasingly vulnerable.
Experts caution that a disjointed approach in the security environment—where individual states operate autonomously with minimal collaboration—may lead to vulnerabilities that opponents can take advantage of. DHS, due to its extensive responsibilities and access to national intelligence, is distinctly placed to offer support for a coordinated response.
Yet that potential will only be realized if state officials trust the agency’s motives, capabilities, and professionalism. As one election official put it, “We don’t have the luxury of mistrust when the stakes are this high—but we do have to be cautious about who we trust.”
As the 2024 general election approaches, election officials at both state and local levels are finishing their cybersecurity plans and logistical arrangements. It’s still uncertain if DHS will be a key player in these plans in various states, particularly in those that are still dealing with issues related to staffing and previous political meddling.
Some lawmakers have called for additional funding to bolster both DHS and state election offices, recognizing that robust defense requires investment at all levels. Others advocate for legislative reforms to clarify the agency’s responsibilities and insulate its leadership from political pressure.
Meanwhile, CISA continues to engage stakeholders, refine its messaging, and expand its support services in an effort to regain the confidence of all 50 states. The ultimate test will be whether those efforts translate into effective, trusted collaboration when the next major election cycle begins.
The history of previous disputes and current limitations in resources have led some states to doubt the dependability of the Department of Homeland Security in safeguarding elections. Although the agency is still a vital component in the wider cybersecurity field, restoring full confidence among state leaders hinges on being transparent, enhancing staffing, and showing a true dedication to impartial aid.
As elections grow more complex and digital threats more sophisticated, ensuring that every level of government can work together securely is essential. Without it, the vulnerabilities aren’t just technological—they’re institutional, and they strike at the very foundation of democratic participation.
